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Abstract 
Because political party membership could potentially confer large economic benefits, economists have 
increasingly turned their attention to the role of political and social status in one’s life. The Chinese 
Communist party is the biggest political party in the world, and members are often motivated to join for 
economic reasons. Previous studies examine the relationship between Communist party membership and 
earnings and find positive correlation but this correlation may be partly or totally spurious, thereby 
generating upwards-biased estimates of the importance of political party membership – political party 
membership is likely to be correlated with a variety of other variables, which may well drive the correlation 
between political party membership and earnings. Using a 1993 housing dataset, this paper estimates the 
causal effect of Chinese party membership on monthly earnings in two major cities in China by employing 
a more robust estimation technique than previously used. I contribute to the existing literature by estimating 
the true causal effect of Communist party membership on wages with a propensity score matching 
technique, a quasi-experimental method which mimics a randomized control trial by constructing 
statistically similar control and treatment groups. I find that, on average, membership in the Communist 
party of China increases monthly earnings by 9 percent. 
 
 
Introduction: the Economic Value of Political Status 
Because party membership can confer large economic benefits, economists have 
increasingly turned their attention to the role political and social status plays in one’s life. Recent 
studies in developing countries have shown how politi cal status affects investment in Indonesia 
(Fishman, 2001), firm value in Jordan (Erkal & Kali, 2012), and wages in China (Li, Liu, Zhang 
& Ma, 2007). China’s rapid economic development and one-party government structure make it 
an ideal case for a study of the economic value of political status. 
The last thirty years mark China’s incredible rise from an isolated communist country 
plagued by cultural upheaval and famine to a global world power with the world’s second largest 
economy. As multiple studies show, in a country like China, political status and connectedness 
can provide numerous monetary and non-monetary benefits (Morduch & Sicular, 2000; Li et al., 
2007; Appleton, Knight, Song & Xia, 2004; Wu, Wu & Rui, 2010). 
The Communist party of China is the largest political party in the world (Yuen, 2013). 
With over eighty million members and growth of an average of one million members per year, 
the party will likely remain the largest party in the world (Yuen, 2013). More than 80 percent of 
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upper-classmen at Chinese universities apply for Communist party membership (The Economist, 
2014). Rather than joining the party for its ideals, many join because they believe it will better 
their prospects in the job market, and membership is increasingly seen as a resume booster (Yuen, 
2013). 
Party membership could translate into better economic outcomes in several distinct ways. 
Party membership often serves as a signal of a person’s ability. As the process is difficult and an 
applicant must undergo intense scrutiny, a potential employer knows that party membership 
captures an applicant’s ability (Li et al., 2007). Furthermore, membership in the party gives an 
applicant access to a network of local members, which may help an applicant find a high-paying 
job (Morduch & Sicular, 2000). Finally, some jobs in the public sector require membership, such 
as jobs in provincial and local governments (The Economist, 2014). This study focuses on whether 
the net effect of these mechanisms empirically translate into higher earnings for Communist party 
members. 
I use data from the 1993 China Housing Survey (CHS). The CHS collected a wealth of 
information on demographics, political affiliation, family relations, housing conditions, etc. from 
households in two major cities in China: Shanghai and Tianjin. The dataset also includes 
information on whether or not the respondent was a member of the Chinese Communist party and 
information on the respondent’s monthly earnings. Existing estimates of the effect of political 
status on economic outcomes rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which cannot properly detect 
the true causal effect of party membership on wages. People who join the Communist party may 
innately differ – due to family background and ability --other than being party members. Such 
omitted variables can produce biased (i.e., off-target) estimates of the true economic benefit of a 
political party membership, i.e., the so-called omitted variable bias. 
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I contribute to the existing literature by estimating the true causal effect of Communist 
party membership on wages by using a propensity score matching technique, a quasi-experimental 
method which mimics a randomized control trial by constructing statistically similar control and 
treatment groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984; Imbens, 2004; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; 
Imbens & Rubin, 2014; Abadie, Drukker, Herr & Imbens, 2003; Angrist & Krueger, 2000; Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009). I find members of the Communist party do receive higher monthly earnings. 
The OLS method estimates a party premium of almost 15 percent after accounting for location 
fixed effects and education, while propensity score matching estimates a party premium of 9 
percent after accounting for location fixed effects and education. This paper’s estimates provide 
strong evidence that there are large economic monetary benefits to joining the Communist Party 
of China. 
 
The Communist Party of China, Political Capital and the Labor Market 
The Communist party of China is a “vanguard party,” meaning it should consist of the 
most capable and ideologically enlightened few of society (Xia, n.d.). In order to ensure that 
members reflect the best of society, the party admission process is long and rigorous. An 
applicant must show that he or she performs better than his or her co-workers or classmates, have 
excellent interpersonal skills, and believe in Communist ideology (Li et al., 2007). 
In order for the party to determine whether an applicant exhibits these traits, an applicant 
is assigned an advisor from within the party who supervises his or her progress throughout the 
application process. The applicant must periodically submit letters to their advisor throughout the 
process to show dedication, and attend courses on party membership (Xia, n.d.). Finally, each 
applicant must secure sponsorships from within the party, and enter into a yearlong probationary 
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period, throughout which their peers are invited to submit letters of feedback on the applicant. 
Only after that probationary year, each applicant is considered a full member (Xia, n.d.). This 
entire process can take years of hard work. 
Similar to education being a form of investment in human capital (Mincer, 1974; Willis, 
1986), obtaining a party membership can serve as a form of investment in political capital in the 
Chinese labor market (Pan, 2010). As the Communist party attracts the brightest and best of 
Chinese society, membership in the party serves as a signal of an applicant’s ability for employers 
(Pan, 2010). 
Party membership can also play an information role and reveal to employers, in information 
asymmetric markets, who are the more able and more productive workers. Information asymmetry 
in the labor market is intrinsic to a situation where (at least initially) employers do not know the 
future productivity levels of potential employees. In a labor market with no asymmetric 
information, where employers can perfectly ascertain potential employees’ productivity, these 
kinds of signals would be unnecessary. Employers would be able to accurately assess the ability 
and productivity of every potential employee, and then hire an employee based on his or her ability 
match with the requirements for the job. Following this reasoning, employees would receive 
salaries based on their ability and on commensurate with their marginal product of labor – their 
contribution to a firm’s output. 
However, in the real world, the process of matching unemployed workers to suitable jobs 
with vacancies, and the bargaining process by which salaries are set are hindered by imperfect 
information (Yashiv, 2007). It is practically impossible for employers to assess precisely a 
potential employee’s ability. Therefore, employers must rely on certain observable signals that 
may reflect a potential employee’s ability and productivity (Spence, 1973). . These indicators 
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include the potential hire’s level of education and whether the potential employee comes well 
recommended (Velasco, 2012). In China, membership in the Communist party functions as one of 
these easily observable indicators for employers. These indicators translate directly into economic 
benefits for the potential employee: (1) they affect the decision of an employer on whether to hire 
an employee, and (2) they affect the bargaining process by which employees’ salaries are 
determined. In this way, the political capital of party membership should pay off. This paper 
addresses the question of whether this investment into political capital actually pays off in the form 
of higher monthly earnings. 
 
Towards a More Causal Estimate of the Party Premium 
Multiple studies have attempted to measure the effect of party membership on income. 
Morduch & Sinclair (2000) measure the effect of being involved in the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) on household income in rural China. They measured involvement in the CPC on 
two levels: 1) The household includes a party member and 2) the household includes a party 
cadre. A party cadre is someone who “holds an official position of political or administrative 
leadership” (Morduch & Sicular, 2000). Morduch & Sinclair (2000) argue that in order for 
transition in a socialist country like China to succeed, rank-and-file officials (in the case of 
China, party cadres) need to have some incentive to administrate the changes of the transition 
even if it could have a negative effect on their political and economic status. Subsequently, we 
should see positive household income effects on having a cadre member in the household. 
Using an OLS method, Morduch & Sinclair (2000) found that there were large income benefits for 
those households with a cadre. In households with a cadre, household income was roughly 20 
percent higher than the average income of their sample. However, they also found that in 
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households with just one party member, there was no significant difference in household income. 
These results show that there may be no economic benefit to being a party member; the benefit 
only comes at higher levels of Communist party involvement. 
While Morduch & Sinclair (2000)’s results shed some light on the party premium, their 
study’s scope is not only not comprehensive, but their study’s research design cannot detect the 
true causal effects of party membership. Morduch & Sinclair (2000) only examined rural China, 
where the networks and credentials that Communist party membership confers may have little 
benefit because of a lack of opportunities. In addition, because of their OLS design, they cannot 
detect true causal effects if observable but not accounted for in the analysis factors (e.g., individual 
innate ability) are correlated with party membership and earnings. 
In contrast, my paper examines the effect of party membership in two of China’s major cities, 
Tianjin and Shanghai, where the benefits provided by networks and credentials could potentially 
be substantially higher. 
Li et al. (2007) uses the Chinese Twins Survey, which collected data on twins in five cities 
in China. The researchers measure the effect of party membership on income in pairs of twins 
where one is a member and the other is not. They use twins to account for observable and 
unobservable differences that result in omitted variable biases in normal OLS estimations. Their 
OLS estimate suggests that the income of party members was 10 percent higher than non-party 
members, but when accounting for “within-twin-pair fixed effects” to control for differences in 
ability and family background, there is no difference in income between party members and non-
party members. 
While measuring the effect of CPC membership within twin pairs accounts for the bias of 
ability due to genes, ability consists of more than just genes, justifying further investigation. 
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Sibling (twin) models not only do not eliminate ability bias (due to non-genetic component of 
ability) but measurement error can be exacerbated in sibling models. Furthermore, there may be 
unobservable ways in which twins, or the social environment they grow up in, might 
fundamentally differ from non-twins. In particular, it is not clear that the relationship between 
political status and the labor market outcomes for a set of twins can extrapolate to the general 
population, further limiting the external validity of their results. I attempt to achieve greater 
external validity in my study by using propensity score matching on a dataset that is more 
representative of the general population than the sample used by Li et al. (2007). While Li et al.’s 
use of twins is groundbreaking, their study is by no means conclusive, and my study will 
complement the existing literature by examining the relationship among a non-twin sample. 
 
Data on Party Membership and Earnings 
I use data from the China Housing Survey carried out in 1993 in Tianjin and Shanghai. 
This cross-sectional dataset was collected at the household level – 2,096 households were 
interviewed in total, of which 1,054 were in Shanghai and 1,042 were in Tianjin. Data is self-
reported and was gathered through a questionnaire that one respondent from each household was 
asked to complete. 
The main topics of the survey questions included housing conditions, family composition, 
and employment specifics. Information was collected on up to 9 of the respondent’s household 
members, as well as the respondent’s spouse, parents and in-laws, regardless of whether they lived 
in the household. Other data recorded include background information, such as age, sex, education, 
income, and health. The survey also covered social topics, such as participation in welfare 
programs, job opportunities, housing allocation and work unit information. Concerning political 
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affiliation, the respondent chose one of four choices: Communist Party member, Youth League 
member, Democratic Party member and “no political affiliation.” 
Table 1 presents background information and summary statistics for three groups from the 
dataset: the entire sample, those who are members of the Communist party and those who are not. 
In this dataset, Communist party members make up 19 percent of the entire sample, and on 
average, tend to be slightly older than the sample, with an average age of 51, compared to the 
sample average of 47. Communist party members are also disproportionately male compared to 
the entire sample. Communist party members are more likely to live in Tianjin as opposed to 
Shanghai, with 65 percent living in Tianjin, and 50 percent of the entire sample living in Tianjin. 
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Furthermore, party members tend to be better educated, as 30 percent of members have completed 
at least some form of higher education, compared to only 14 percent of the general sample 
population. Finally, the average monthly earnings of non-members is approximately 269 RMB 
(approx. 50 USD), while the average monthly earnings of members is 346 RMB (approx. 56 USD), 
about 22 percent higher than that of non-members. Although, we cannot conclude that membership 
causes higher earnings, this table shows that a positive relationship between party membership and 
earnings exists. 
The wealth of information on labor market outcomes in this dataset enables me to use the 
Propensity Score Matching technique to construct control and treatment groups that are 
statistically similar. Furthermore, the dataset was one of the few available that included data on 
political affiliation. However, the dataset is not without its limitations. The questionnaires were 
only administered in two cities, which could present somewhat limited generalizability or external 
validity of my results to other settings. 
 
Empirical Estimates of the Party Premium 
In order to estimate the returns to Communist party membership on monthly earnings in 
China, I use two methods: the OLS method and the Propensity Score Matching method. 
OLS 
In general, the goal of this paper is to estimate an equation of the form: 
Ln(Earni)=β0+β1Ci + ϵi       (1) 
where Earn i represents monthly earnings, and β1 represents the marginal returns to being a 
member of the Communist party, represented by the dummy variable Ci. Subscript i denotes each 
individual in the dataset. 
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Given a set of strong assumptions, the OLS method can produce an unbiased estimate of β1, which 
captures the difference in earnings between a party member and non-party member, all else equal.1. 
Just estimating the relationship between Ln(Earni) and Ci alone using (1) will lead to omitted 
variable bias in β1. The issue is that party membership is likely to be correlated with a variety of 
other variables, which will drive the estimate of β
1
.2. Innate ability and family background can be 
two examples of such omitted variables (Lang, 1993). For instance, because joining the 
Communist party is a rigorous process, those who have more inherent ability will be more likely 
to be accepted, and at the same time those who have more inherent ability will also be more likely 
to have higher incomes. 
We can attempt to deal with the problem of omitted variable bias due to innate ability (i.e., 
ability bias) by adding the term Ai, which captures individual-specific ability and family 
background characteristics that affect earnings, exogenous from Ci, and μ is the coefficient on Ai: 
Ln(Earni)=β0+β1 Ci+μAi+ϵi       (2) 
Including term Ai in the OLS regression (1) will likely decrease the estimate of β1due to omitted 
variables in (1). Because the China Housing Survey does not include variables that account for all 
the differences in ability and family background characteristics (as represented by Ai), I employ 
other variables readily available in the dataset to proxy these two constructs. 
Next, I add a set of demographic controls, represented by χ1...χ6.: 
Ln(Earni)=β0+β1Ci+γ1 χ1+γ2 χ2+⋯+γ6 χ6+ϵi       (3) 
                                                          
1 The assumptions necessary for OLS to produce unbiased coefficient estimates (i.e., centered at the true coefficient 
estimate of the estimand) are: correct specification, strict exogeneity of error term, no linear dependence between 
regressors and spherical errors (necessary for efficiency of coefficients). OLS can produce consistent estimates of 
β1 only with strict exogeneity of the error term in (1).  
2 More generally, omitted variable bias occurs when there are variables correlated with both monthly earnings and 
political affiliation that are not included in the regression. 
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These controls include dummy variables for sex (whether or not a respondent is male), ethnicity 
(whether or not a respondent is of the Han majority), age (continuous definition), marital status 
(whether or not the respondent is married or not), religion (whether or not the respondent is 
religious or not), and health (whether or not a respondent is in poor health). While this specification 
includes many variables that will account for biases due to these basic demographic covariates, the 
coefficient β1 might still be prone to omitted variable bias because of other characteristics related 
to ability and family background. 
In the next specification I run, I use education as a proxy for ability, as it takes greater 
ability to reach higher levels of education. However, the dataset did not include years of education. 
Instead, it asks a respondent to choose one choice from a list that best reflects their highest level 
of education attained. The list includes the following: “No formal schooling,” “Elementary,” 
“Junior high school,” “Senior high school,” “Technical school,” “Vocational school,” “3 year 
college,” “Formal college,” and “Graduate school.” I include each education level (omitting “no 
formal schooling” for collinearity) in the following regression as dummy variables. In addition, I 
attempt to deal with the ability bias by including individual-specific fixed effects3: 
Ln(Earni)=β0+β1 Ci+γ1 χ1+⋯+γ6 χ6+α1 θ1+α2 θ2+⋯+α8 θ8+ϵi       (4) 
Individual and cluster-controls included in that specification will account for differences that are 
constant across time (this is the so-called fixed term specification). In this specification, each level 
of education is represented by a dummy variable θn, with αn representing the marginal returns to 
each level of education. 
In my final OLS specification, I include district fixed effects to control for further 
differences related to the geographic areas where data respondents live. The districts in the city of 
                                                          
3 Fixed effects are “dummy variables” that account for attributes – whether observable or unobservable - of the units 
that do not change over time.  
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Tianjin included in the dataset are Hepin, Nankai, Hexi, Hedong, Hongxiang, Hebei, Tanggu, 
Hanggu, and Dagang. The districts in the city of Shanghai included in the dataset are Huangpu, 
Nanshi, Luwan, Xuhui, Changning, Jingan, Putou, Zhabei, Hongkou, Yangpu, Minhang and 
Baoshan. Table 1 shows that the Communist party members are more likely to live in Tianjin than 
Shanghai, implying that differences in location matter. This could be because one is more likely 
to become a Communist party member if they live closer to the capital (Tianjin is closer to Beijing), 
or for some other reason. Furthermore, the district one lives in can represent family background to 
the extent that different districts may include families of different socioeconomic statuses, and 
certain districts may be home to families that have historically held political influence. To try to 
control for these differences, I include dummy variables for each district in each city in the 
following specification: 
Ln(Earni)=β0+β1 Ci+γ1 χ1+⋯+γ6 χ6+α1 θ1+⋯+α8 θ8+δ1 π1+δ2 π2+⋯+δk πk+ϵi      (5) 
In this specification, I add dummy variables for the district a respondent lives in, represented by 
π1…πk. δk is the coefficient for each πk. In this final specification I have controlled for demographic 
differences with the covariates χk, ability differences with the education dummies θk, and family 
background differences with district dummies πk. 
To gauge the magnitude and direction of the omitted variable bias, I can examine how 
β1 changes across specifications (1) through (5). If the estimate of β1 decreases from (1) to (5) then 
adding variables in the OLS estimations indeed reduces the omitted variable bias and the initial 
OLS estimation (1) is upward biased. 
Propensity Score Matching and Matching on Observables 
In addition to the OLS method, I also employ a propensity score matching method (PSM) 
to estimate the effect of membership in the Communist party on monthly earnings. By using PSM, 
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I attempt to mimic the statistical approach of a randomized control trial (RCT) based on the 
literature using matching on observables (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984; Imbens, 2004; Imbens 
& Wooldridge, 2009; Imbens & Rubin, 2014; Abadie et al., 2003; Angrist & Krueger, 2000; 
Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
If I could execute a hypothetical randomized control trial to obtain an unbiased estimate of 
the β1, I would take a sample of individuals and randomly assign control and treatment groups 
where those in the treatment group would be randomly assigned to membership the Communist 
party and those in the control would not have such a membership. Then I would compare the 
monthly earnings between the two groups to estimate the premium on being in the party. The fact 
that these two groups are randomized solves the problem of omitted variables bias because 
theoretically the two groups will be, on average, statistically identical. However, performing this 
experiment is practically and ethically impossible. Propensity score matching artificially 
constructs control and treatment groups, allowing me to compare the two groups (Heinrich, 
Maffioli & Vazquez, 2010). 
The first step to propensity score matching is to assign each observation a propensity score 
(which captures the likelihood of one being a Communist party member). I use the following 
specification to estimate propensity scores4: 
Ci=β0+γ1 χ1+⋯+γ6 χ6+α1 θ12 θ2+⋯+α8 θ8+ϵi       (6) 
where these variables determining propensity to join the party are: sex (whether or not a respondent 
is male), ethnicity (whether or not a respondent is of the Han majority), marital status (whether or 
not the respondent is married or not), religion (whether or not the respondent is religious or not), 
and education. The estimated Ĉ is each observation’s propensity score--a value between 0 and 1 
                                                          
4 Refer to the OLS section for the definitions of the variables. 
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that represents the probability an observation being a member of the Communist party based on 
the characteristics included in the estimation. 
I then use the nearest-neighbor matching technique to match observations in the 
Communist party (actual C of 1) with observations not in the Communist party (actual C of 0) 
based on their propensity score (estimated Ĉ), placing those with the actual C of 1 into the 
treatment group and those with the actual C of 0 into the control group. This matching procedure 
produces two groups – a treatment group and a control group that are statistically similar. 
The final step is to estimate the effect of membership in the Communist party on earnings. It is 
represented by β_1 in the following equation: 
Ln(Earni)= β0+β1 Ĉi+ϵi       (7) 
This ‘average treatment effect’ is the mean of the differences between the log monthly 
earnings outcomes for each observation in the treatment group and the log monthly earnings 
outcomes for the matched observations in the control group (StataCorp, 2013) represented by β1 in 
(7). 
 
The Party Premium itself: What do the numbers tell us? 
In this section, I present two sets of results – those from the OLS method and those from 
the propensity score matching method. Table 2 shows the results from the OLS regressions; Table 
3 shows the results from propensity score matching. 
OLS Results 
Column 1 (of Table 1) presents the results estimated using equation 2. This regression 
estimated a return of 18.9 percent higher monthly earnings to membership in the Communist party 
of China, significant at the 1 percent level. It is likely that this estimation suffers from omitted 
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variable bias, and the bias is likely upward. One reason for this bias is that those who have more 
education are more likely to be accepted into the Communist party and likely to receive higher 
earnings. 
Column 2 presents the results estimated by equation 3. This regression estimated a return 
of 11.1 percent higher monthly earnings to membership in the Communist party, also significant 
at the 1 percent level. This downward change in the estimate is consistent with expectations, for 
education is controlled for, and the positive effects of education that were reflected in the 
coefficient on Communist party membership have been sifted out. All of the coefficients on the 
education covariates were statistically significant, with only the coefficient for graduate school 
significant at less than the 1 percent level. The coefficients on education are consistent with 
expectations in both column 2 and 3. As the level of schooling increases, so do the estimated 
returns to education, with the returns to elementary school at 15.3 percent and the returns to 
graduate school at 64.5 percent. There are no notable differences between regressions in the 
estimated coefficients. 
Column 3 presents the results estimated by equation (5). This regression estimated a return of 14.7 
percent higher monthly earnings to membership in the Communist party, also significant at the 1 
percent level.5  
Propensity Score Matching 
Table 3 presents the results from the propensity score matching method. 
                                                          
5 While not included in the table, the coefficients on the district dummy variables have some interesting 
implications. All of the coefficients on the districts in Tianjin except for one are significant at the 1 percent level, 
while none of the coefficients on the districts in Shanghai are statistically significant. This could be because only 
34.62 percent of Communist party members included in the dataset live in Shanghai, meaning there may not have 
been enough observations to result in statistically significant values for the Shanghai district. 
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As opposed to regressing covariates on the log of monthly earnings, this method mimics a 
randomized control trial by creating treatment and control groups that are statistically similar in 
all aspects accounted for in the specifications creating the propensity scores. The coefficient 
represented in each column is determined from the regression in equation (7). I find an average 
treatment effect of a 9 percent return to Communist party membership in China. All estimates were 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
Acker ⦁ The Value of Political Status in a Liberalizing China 
 
18 
 
 
 Alpenglow: Binghamton University Undergraduate Journal of Research and Creative Activity⦁2015⦁Vol.1⦁Iss1 
  
19 
 
Threats to Internal Validity 
The propensity score matching technique likely reduces omitted variable bias because of 
the matching step. While this method may better predict the effect of being in the Communist party 
on monthly earnings than the OLS regression, its internal validity rests on accurately including 
factors in specification (6) that influence the treatment variable (i.e., being a Communist party 
member). In addition, the matching step implicitly assumes that matching happens only on 
observable characteristics (as opposed to unobservable one that the data cannot capture). 
The indicators I use to account for individual ability and family background exhibit several 
limitations. While the level of education an individual attains does reflect that individual’s ability, 
it is possible that equally able individuals do not reach as high a level of education as they should 
because, for example, they may not be able to afford higher education. Also, district fixed effects 
are not a perfect indicator for family background, for while they can reflect things like a particular 
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family’s socioeconomic status, there are many aspects of family background that could affect 
monthly earnings that cannot be determined simply by the area a family lives in. 
 
Conclusion 
One million Chinese citizens join the Communist party of China every year, and over 80 
percent of graduating college students apply. Membership in the party is perceived as an 
investment in political capital that can help one get a better job and higher salaries. Yet, previous 
literature has overlooked the full array of economic benefits due to party membership. 
Using a 1993 China Household Survey, this paper quantifies the wage premium of 
membership in the Chinese Communist party. Using different specifications to attempt to control 
for observable and unobservable characteristics, I find that membership in the communist party of 
China does pay off, in the form of 9 percent higher monthly earnings. This estimate is considerably 
lower than the OLS estimates, suggesting that OLS estimates of the effect of membership in the 
Chinese communist party on monthly earnings are upward biased. This paper’s PSM estimate is 
comparable to estimates from papers employing causally robust study designs. Li et al. (2007) 
measure a party premium of 10 percent outside of within twin pairs, and Appleton et al. (2004) 
also estimate a 10 percent party premium. The fact that the PSM method results in a comparable 
estimate to the studies using twins (Li et al., 2007) adds to the existing literature by suggesting that 
the PSM method can substantially reduce omitted variable bias that plagues OLS estimations. 
Although I employ a causally robust quasi-experimental method, more research could help 
researchers understand through what channels party membership translates into higher earnings. 
Is it because members get access to a network of other members that can connect them to good 
jobs? Is it because employers take membership as an indicator for ability? The answers to these 
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questions will be valuable to those interested in Chinese politics and to those interested in 
disentangling the mechanisms that translate political status into better economic status in China. 
The answers to these questions may change as China’s political landscape changes. There have 
already been calls by several politicians to tighten the selection criteria for party membership and 
make the application process more rigorous (Yuen, 2013). This call for tightening the party 
membership selection criteria would discourage individuals who want to join the party for 
economic gains only and to encourage ideological purity within the party. 
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